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R E S E A R C H E S S A Y S
L E A N H T U A N , A L I S O N C O T T R E L L ,
A N D D A V I D K I N G
Changes in Social Capital: A Case Study
of Collective Rice Farming Practices
in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam
Collective rice cultivation has long been a traditional agricultural prac-tice for the majority of farmers in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam.
Group-based rice farming practices date back at least to the era of French
colonization (–), when many farmers were landless and worked as
tenants. Despite difficulties in rural life through poverty and war, or perhaps
because of these challenges, collective rice cultivation practices persisted
over time. These practices endured throughout the French colonial era, the
First and Second Indochina Wars (–), and the period of socialism
following reunification in . However, the popularity of group-based rice
farming in the Delta finally began declining in the late s, with little
evidence of it currently remaining.
This rich history of collective farming traditions demanded a high level of
social capital among rice farmers, who were driven by the need to collaborate
to overcome difficulties in rice production. Yet surprisingly little has been
written about the history of social capital in Vietnam, particularly in refer-
ence to collective rice farming. In the existing literature, authors have made
reference to trends in social capital associated with events such as land
reform, collectivization and decollectivization, adoption of new rice farming
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technologies, and market liberalization. However, there appears to be little
detail on how social capital manifests in specific situations. There is also little
discussion of how the decline of collective cooperation in farming in the
contemporary era might affect, and be affected by, social capital changes
among households and within communities.
This study aimed to understand how certain components of social capital
among rice farmers have changed over time, from the era of French colo-
nization to the late s, when many aspects of social capital appeared to be
strongly in decline, at least among Mekong Delta farmers. The study used
a mixed methods approach, including document analysis and surveys, to
explain these changes in social capital. Document analysis was used for the
period when mutual aid was first established in the early twentieth century
(if not before), until the early s. To establish a causal and descriptive
inference for this growth in mutual aid based on social capital, we used
a comparative-historical method to explain the sequence of changes. Our
focus was on important social, economic, and political junctures mentioned
in the literature as having affected the stock of social capital. To explain the
period when mutual aid started to decline in popularity in the late s, we
based analysis primarily on qualitative data from social surveys conducted in
the Mekong Delta. Finally, we examined the current stock of social capital
among farmers’ traditional rice farming network using qualitative and quan-
titative data from recent surveys. We then inferred changes in the nature of
social capital using this mixed methods approach.
Our study concludes that the decline of mutual aid groups stemmed from
a number of factors: mounting pressure on crop timing as a result of short-
ened crop duration and synchronized irrigation; changes in social relations
as a consequence of absentee landlordism and land fragmentation following
the  Land Law; and an increasingly open market that allows farmers to
access credit and assistance from business enterprises, rather than from
neighbors and kin as in the past. The decline in need for mutual aid in rice
farming appears to have also lessened the need for other forms of social
capital among farmers, as evidenced by weaker neighborhood ties among
farm families in our An Giang study site.
In this article, we explore the concept of social capital in the social science
literature and its applicability to the case study in the Mekong Delta, then
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explore the relationship between collective rice farming practices and the
need for different types of social capital over time. We discuss the current
state of farming practices in the Mekong Delta through an examination of
social relations among farmers in An Giang province, and conclude with
a discussion of the implications of the decline of collective action for future
development projects.
Social Capital
Social capital is a concept that describes circumstances in which individuals
can use membership in groups and networks to secure benefits. The con-
cept helps explain how the problem of incentives for selfishness can be
overcome to achieve a mutually beneficial cooperative way of getting things
done. Typically, social capital implies voluntary cooperation that is self-
enforcing and based on informal, unwritten institutions and norms. Accord-
ing to a World Bank research paper:
Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the
norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions
in which they are embedded. It is the glue that holds societies together and
without which there can be no economic growth or human well-being.
Without social capital, society at large will collapse, and today’s world presents
some very sad examples of this.
The concept of social capital can be traced back at least to the works of de
Tocqueville (), Hanifan (), Jacobs () and Bourdieu ().
However, the growth in popularity of social capital has led to a concomitant
growth of different interpretations of the concept. For example, Pierre
Bourdieu has defined social capital as “The aggregate of the actual or poten-
tial resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or
less institutionalized relationship of mutual acquaintance or recognition.”
But for James Coleman, “social capital is defined by its function. It is not
a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two elements in
common: that all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facil-
itate certain actions of individuals—whether persons or corporate actors—
who are within the structure.” From Robert Putnam: “social capital refers
to features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”
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Irrespective of different definitions, social capital, at its core, is a material
concept that connects individuals through networks, norms, and trust for
a shared, mutual benefit. Hence, social capital is important for explaining
collective action in the context of different social, economic and political
settings. Ostrom and Ahn suggest that theorists of social capital open dis-
course on the topic by putting collective action at the center of economic and
political problems. Collective-action theory (known also as first-
generation collective-action models) often assumes homogeneous, selfish
individuals at its core. Social capital, which considers factors including
norms, networks, and trust, has neither been properly understood nor cap-
tured even to a limited extent in these first-generation collective-action
models. However, understanding how social capital facilitates collective
action allows us to step beyond these first-generation models.
If social capital facilitates efficient bargaining, harnessing social capital
could provide information that may make additional cooperation possible.
Groups should be able to commit to an institution that provides a sensible
way to govern the commons. One should be looking not only for the features
of institutions that facilitate good outcomes, but how to build these institu-
tions andwhatmakes them stable. For example, different communities have
different methods to arrive at consensus. These methods needed to be cus-
tomized to the local settings to enable the execution of good, people-centered
arrangements. Pretty and Ward provide a useful framework for investigat-
ing social capital in any particular setting. They consider social capital to
consist of four major components: trust; reciprocity and exchange; common
rules, norms and sanctions; and connectedness, networks and groups.
Social norms are principles that guide individual behaviors based on
shared beliefs about how individuals should behave in a particular situa-
tion. As such, social norms are typically unconditional, which means
group members are expected to observe/abide by the norms/rules. But even
when they are conditional, they are not necessarily “future-oriented,” and
more importantly, norms are shared by people whose approval or disap-
proval, to certain extent, sustains them. The concept of norms is based on
three dimensions: expectations, values, and behavior. Elster has suggested
that people are predisposed to adherence to norms because of their tendency
to avoid the “feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt, and shame” that they
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may suffer when going against the norms, or they wish to conform to norms
for positive emotions. According to James Coleman, the need for a social
norm arises in situations where actions of one individual affect other people
around him, or when “actions cause positive or negative side-effects for
other people.”
We explore these concepts in our study by examining a case where rice
farmers in An Giang, Vietnam were expected to cooperate effectively in
order to apply successfully an agricultural technology developed for rodent
management. The introduced technology is empirically cost-effective and
environmentally friendly compared to existing farmers’ rodent management
practice. Thus, our assumption was that the farmers, with their tradition of
mutual aid practices, would adopt the technology through voluntary coop-
eration and organization among themselves to lower production costs
thanks to informal transactions, where it is not necessary to monitor and
enforce all the transactions.However, the trial of the technology was not as
expected and its wide-scale adoption seemed challenging, since farmers
found collaborating to collectively adopt the introduced technology difficult.
Thus, our study decided to look back at the mutual aid farming practice of
rice farmers in the past, such as when they had to collaborate in irrigation,
labor exchange, and in other activities beyond farming. Yet, at the time this
study was done in , rice farmers no longer adopted mutual aid practices.
Therefore, collaborating with each other at the field level to collectively
adopt the introduced technology for rodent management was challenging.
By analyzing the socioeconomic constraints that rice farmers faced in adopt-
ing the introduced rodent management technology, we found that social
capital (manifested in trust, norms of reciprocity, and social networking)
among rice farmers had declined. Consequently, organizing their cooperation
to adopt the introduced technology for which they had no strong demand
(primarily because they can use chemical controls instead) proved extremely
difficult. Our findings suggest that when collective works are required among
farmers, such as might be the case with introduced agricultural and rural
development projects, it is important to understand the existing level of
social capital among the target community, and to determine if such stock
of social capital is sufficient to facilitate long-term collective action so as to
design an appropriate development intervention approach.
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Methods and Data
We used a mixed methods approach for this study. First, a comparative
historical method was used for the analysis of academic literature on the
history of cooperative farming techniques and mutual aid in particular.
Then, for understanding of the contemporary context, we purposely selected
two districts—Tri Tôn and Tịnh Biên of An Giang province in the Mekong
Delta—to allow in-depth study (see Figure  for location of the study site).
We chose these districts for two reasons: first, they are typical of intensive
rice-growing areas in the Mekong Delta and have experienced the same
historical events as other parts of the Mekong. Second, we benefited from
a quantitative data set collected under a project that was designed to pro-
mote the use of collectively-based environmentally-friendly rodent control
management, administered by the Plant Protection Department of Vietnam
(PPD) with technical support from the Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) and the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI).
F I G U R E 1 : Location of Study Sites.
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The study in An Giang employed qualitative and quantitative methods.
The qualitative method used focus group discussions, key informant inter-
views, informal interviews, participant observation, field observation tech-
niques, and comparative-historical analysis. Research participants for the
qualitative research included rice farmers, representatives from communal
government agencies, district departments of agriculture and rural develop-
ment, district plant protection departments, and local opinion leaders. We
recruited ten groups of farmers (five from each selected commune of the two
districts) for group discussions, comprising seventy-three farmers in total,
and interviewed thirty-three farmers during two field trips that were con-
ducted ten months apart, using a prepared guide for the discussions and
interviews. We used the same guides for all research participants. However,
the focus of content varied depending on the knowledge, roles, and respon-
sibilities of the research participants.
We used the quantitative data set for the study sites in the Mekong Delta
that was collected by the team at the IRRI and PPD under a project funded
by the Australian Center for International Agricultural Research. The data
set was collected via a household survey of  randomly selected partici-
pants ( from each district). These data were entered and checked by the
team at PPD, IRRI and CSIRO. We then analyzed the data using SPSS
Statistics. We recorded qualitative data using note-taking instead of a tape
recorder to allow for open discussion. Notes were taken by two persons and
were cross-checked at the end of each day before being transcribed. To
ensure trustworthiness, validity, and reliability, in addition to methodolog-
ical and data source triangulation, we solicited feedback on the data and our
preliminary analysis results from research participants in our second trip for
follow-up discussions.
History of Social Capital in the Mekong
In the Mekong Delta today, rice cultivation is primarily done individually.
Yet in the past, it was done collectively, typically by groups of people who
were linked by kin, neighbor and/or friendship. These self-help groups were
known as dần công, meaning “labor exchange group” or “mutual aid group.”
Mutual aid reflects a form of social capital that persisted in rice farming
communities in the Mekong Delta over many decades until it was eventually
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abandoned in the s. This section briefly reviews the history of rice
farming in the Mekong Delta, focusing on critical social events in history
that were described in the literature to have been associated with the ups and
downs of mutual aid.
C O L O N I A L P E R I O D (     –     )
The farmers in the Mekong delta have a long history of collective farming
through the organization of mutual aid groups. In An Giang, labor
exchange to help each other in rice farming was common from the time
of the French colony and it appears from the literature to have been con-
sidered a social norm. This norm was so highly observed that seldom were
there cases where a group member broke the rules. Breaching the rules or
norms would mean that breakers wanted exclusion from the group. The
consequences were very likely to impair their prestige, and put their rice
cultivation as risk from labor sanctions imposed by other group members.
Under colonization, mutual aid groups were formed to enable farmers
from different households to help each other with labor-intensive farm work
such as land preparation, transplanting, irrigation, and harvesting. People
who worked in mutual aid teams were normally kin or residential neighbors
who assisted one another in heavy agricultural tasks, and often this assis-
tance went beyond farming to non-farm works such as house repairs or
construction of thatched houses. Helping each other in water irrigation, for
example, was a particularly important task, as this work is not only stren-
uous for individuals but also relies on interconnected sluices and canals,
making teamwork indispensable. To raise water to an appropriate level, and
then to successive fields at different levels, teams of scoopers needed to work
together.
Thus mutual aid groups were considered a “village institution of loose
organization but great importance,” in which “each farmer tends to establish
a network of relatives, neighbors, and friends within which he exchanges labor
in the course of the rice cycle.” Mutual aid in farming was particularly
common among low-income households. In lower-income families, it was
common that “all members are expected to make some direct contribution
to the sustenance of the group.” In such a collective society, it was con-
sidered “repugnant” for farmers to work on their own. Mutual aid was
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therefore not only an important way of enabling rural people to achieve
sufficient agricultural production, but also served important roles in
enabling village sociality.
P O S T - C O L O N I A L P E R I O D (     –     )
During the post-colonial period in South Vietnam, most land was privately
owned and agricultural activities were aimed at commercial purposes. By
 and the end of French colonization, approximately  percent of the
rice land area in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was held by just .
percent of the rural population, with these large landholdings belonging
to both French and Vietnamese owners. The economic stratification of
peasants in the RVN was acute because of this land concentration, and
resulted in increased numbers of landless laborers and smallholders renting
out their labor to middle-class and well-to-do landowners. Throughout the
s, as a result of the lingering impacts of colonialism, these large differ-
ences with regard to wealth, income and power distribution became more
common in South Vietnam. Even in this challenging context, however,
reciprocal assistance remained an important component of the labor supply.
During the post-colonial period, it was estimated that  percent of villagers
in South Vietnam remained involved in mutual assistance for agricultural
production.
Labor exchange continued during the post-colonial period and was so
common that people who worked on labor exchange teams typically did not
get paid. They simply took turns working in each other’s fields on a recip-
rocal basis. One of the typical mutual works that required high cooperation
was distribution of water. Well-coordinated irrigation enables sufficient
water to be supplied to the paddy fields to ensure optimum crop outputs.
In the Mekong Delta, working in a collaborative manner with farm neigh-
bors to control water levels through manual irrigation remained indispens-
able. Despite the necessity for cooperation, however, water management did
not always go smoothly and disputes over irrigation sometimes occurred.
These disputes became more common after land reforms in  prioritized
the establishment of individual private property rights.
In , a second land reform, known as the “Land-To-The-Tiller” law,
was implemented in the RVN. This reform aimed to further reduce land
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concentration among the remaining landlords. But despite this reform,
mutual aid remained popular, according to Nancy Wiegersma. There were
two main factors that supported the continued exchange of labor in mutual
aid groups. First, the land reforms in  specified that the maximum area
of land distributed to farmers was three hectares, a farm size that would be
adequate for a typical household for subsistence farming, but which might
require labor assistance from others to cultivate. Second, tenant farmers who
cultivated land belonging to others were given priority in land redistribution.
This meant the reform helped previously untenured recipients secure a ten-
ured status. This, in turn, encouraged the new landowners to increase invest-
ment on their own land and, at the same time, allowed them to remain in
their mutual aid groups. These factors explained why labor exchange con-
tinued to grow without suffering from the two land reforms. Wiegersma
does note that there was some evidence of a loss of social cohesion in villages
following the first land reform in . However, the operation of mutual
aid, in aggregate, remained dominant.
P O S T - R E U N I F I C A T I O N (     –     )
Mutual aid continued to operate after reunification in . According to
Professor Võ Tòng Xuân, during attempts at socialist collectivization in the
South from  to , mutual aid groups became even more common.
Farmers in aid groups continued to support each other in labor-intensive
activities, because the means of production (such as tractors, threshers, water
pumping machines, and draft animals), which were originally owned indi-
vidually, had been pooled for use in collectively managed cooperatives.
Kirsch notes that during the collectivization era in the Mekong Delta, mem-
bers of collective agricultural cooperatives still engaged in individual farming
on private plots through the support of mutual help groups. By , nearly
ten years after collectivization,  percent of agricultural households in the
Mekong were estimated to still be farming individual plots with the assis-
tance of organized mutual help groups.
Farmers reported that when lúa mùa, a traditional rice variety that takes
approximately six months to ripen, was still used, labor exchange was vital to
rice farming. Cows and buffalo were then the main means of production
power. Because cattle were rare, farmers needed to borrow animals from
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other farmers to prepare their soil and in return would work for the animal
owner. In addition, because the irrigation system was poor in the post-war
era, water could not be provided in a synchronized manner. As a result, not
all farmers could grow rice at the same time, leaving room for need for labor
exchanges.
Other significant trends following reunification in  included govern-
ment efforts to improve agricultural production in the Mekong Delta.
In addition to expanding irrigation systems, farmers also started to use
new techniques such as high-yielding varieties and relevant crop protection
devices. To accelerate production to fit with the new farming systems, farm-
ers used broadcasting of seed, for instance, in lieu of transplanting, which
took considerably more time and labor. Herbicides were increasingly used
and the increasing need for labor at peak times became demanding. From
, mechanization in the Mekong Delta also started to increase, with the
number of large tractors expanding by  percent as compared to the situ-
ation in .
In , when de-collectivization started despite labor exchange still
being common, the increasing need for labor at peak times began to make
it difficult for farmers to fully commit to labor rotation through mutual
aid. Cecelia Luttrell noted that when labor became increasingly scarce,
renting out of labor “has once again become a major component of the rural
economy and social structure.” At approximately the same time in the
early s, the government introduced a new rice variety to replace lúa
mùa, locally called thần nông [farm god], whose major characteristic was
shortened crop cycles. Together with increasingly synchronized irrigation
thanks to government investments, increased mechanization led to declines
in need for mutual aid. A further blow to mutual aid occurred under a new
land law in . Under the new law, farmland could be transferred,
exchanged, inherited, leased, and used as collateral. This freed up the land
market and allowed land trading, which eventually led once again to land
concentration. By the late s, when farm lands were transferred under
the new law, poor farmers began to sell more land, which disrupted farm
neighborhoods and social networks.
By the time of our research, these trends appeared to have culminated in
a strong decline in mutual aid in farming. Reciprocity among farmers
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appeared minimal, with mutual support among farm neighbors being
reduced to activities such as observation of one’s neighboring farm to check
for pests or anything unusual happening. Despite a previous lengthy exis-
tence, social norms of reciprocity and mutual aid were nearly absent as
a direct impact of recent agrarian reforms, as we explain further below.
Examination of Contemporary Social Capital
in the Mekong Delta
In order to assess the impact of the decline of collective farming, we looked
at social capital as an indicator of potential for collective support. As we
noted previously, social capital has been defined by numerous authors in
a number of ways, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition may derive from
the nature and focus of empirical studies on which the definitions are
grounded. Because social capital is an intangible construct, empirical measures
of social capital that are relevant to one culture may be irrelevant in another
context. There is also a lack of consensus on how social capital should be
measured. Despite these difficulties, social capital is commonly described as
composed of trust, norms (for example, of reciprocity), and networks (or
memberships) that facilitate collective action for mutual benefits.
Social capital can be categorized into two forms. A structural form facil-
itates collective action for mutual benefits based on roles and social networks
that already exist and are enhanced by rules, procedures and precedents.
A cognitive form is manifested in norms, values, attitudes and beliefs, and
acts to encourage collective action for mutual benefit. These two forms of
social capital complement each other. Structural social capital exists in the
way people are connected through their networks to support a particular
purpose and it is observable and modifiable in one way or another. However,
cognitive social capital is not as easily visible because it is manifested
through people’s attitudes, thoughts and actions.
To investigate evidence of contemporary practices reflecting social cap-
ital, we did surveys in two districts of An Giang province in the Mekong
Delta. Assessment of social capital in this study focused on aspects that could
clearly demonstrate any changes in norms, trust, reciprocity and networks
for collective rice farming practices. To better understand associational life
and activities in the community, we assessed the degree to which farmers
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produced rice individually and without assistance from others and their
relations with people beyond their family. To this end, assessment occurred
at two levels: the household level (to assess cognitive social capital) and the
group level (to assess structural social capital).
F A R M E R S ’ P R O F I L E
Approximately  percent of farmers in our survey were younger than 
years of age. The majority of farmers (nearly  percent) had completed
primary school education, some (nearly  percent) had completed second-
ary education, and the remainder had a high school education. Within
a family, the husband typically had a higher level of education than the wife
(see Table ). Most of the farmers had approximately twenty years’ experi-
ence in rice cultivation.
Most farmers (more than  percent) owned their rice lands with the
remainder renting fields and working as tenants. The farm sizes varied
from very small (less than . hectares) to very large (more than 
hectares). (See Table ). Nearly all ( percent) of the farmers grew rice
as their main crop, and only a very small proportion of them grew a cash
crop (primarily cucumbers). They used four modern rice cultivars:
IR, AG, OM, and IR (in descending order of frequency
of use).
T A B L E 1 : Profile of Farmers in the Study Sites
Characteristics
Mean Mode Range SD
n=223
Age (years) 46 43 70 12.276
Household size 4.74 4 13 1.704
Number of children 2.9 2 9 1.664
Farming experience (in years) 18.9 20 58 10.892
Time allocated to farming (months per year) 6.98 6 11 2.016
Membership in local organizations 2.22 1 5 1.717
Education level (*) 2.35 2 3 0.650
NOTE: On educational level, coding is as follows: 0: Illiterate, 1: Preschool education, 2: Primary
school, 3: Secondary school, 4: High school, 5: Vocational school, 6: University.
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Farmers were busy throughout the year, especially during the cropping
seasons. The majority were busy four to nine months a year for their farm
work (see Table ). To overcome family labor shortages they hired external
laborers for rice farming for most stages of a crop. Hired labor typically came
from the local neighborhood or from neighboring communes and were
expected to undertake heavy tasks such as dike repair, sowing of rice, re-
planting of young rice (to replace plants that failed to survive after sowing),
pest control, harvesting, threshing, and transporting of produce. Most hired
laborers for the cropping season were male, except at the harvesting stage
when more females were employed. A farmer with large landholdings hired
up to seventy female laborers at a time for rapid harvesting (see Figure ).
Farm machinery and tools were very common among the households
surveyed. The most widely used farming equipment was water pumps and
T A B L E 2 : Landholdings Distribution among Farmer Households (n=226)
Area of landholdings Frequency (hhs) Percentage of sample
<0.5 22 10%
0.6-1 44 19%
1.1-2ha 62 27%
2.1-3ha 38 17%
3.1-4ha 21 9%
4.1-5ha 7 3%
5.1-6ha 15 7%
6.1-10ha 9 4%
>10ha 8 4%
NOTE: Mean: 2.97, Median: 1.90, Mode: 1.00, SD: 3.93, Variance: 15.50, Range: 26.82, Min: 0.18,
Max: 27.00.
T A B L E 3 : Typical Time Allocation for Agricultural Activities (n=268)
Duration of farming activities Percentage of hhs
1–3 months 3%
4–6 months 46%
7–9 months 41%
10–12 months 10%
100%
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pesticide sprayers. Motorcycles were also widespread. Boats were available in
thirty-seven respondents’ households in this flood-prone area. Fish ponds
and rice drying courts were only found in well-to-do households.
H O U S E H O L D L E V E L S O C I A L C A P I T A L
To assess the level of social capital for an individual farmer, we investigated
the degree to which a farmer produced rice individually by assessing key
issues: their rodent control practices; their confidence in making daily de-
cisions; the degree to which they hired labor; the available means of pro-
duction; and their access to credit.
Rodent Management Practices
Farmers were found to conduct rodent management on their own unless
they were encouraged to take collective action at the instigation of the local
government. Despite farmers consulting a number of sources for advice on
rodent management, their own decisions based on their own experiences
Note:    
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F I G U R E 2 : Labor Distribution in the 2006 Summer-Autumn Season.
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predominated (χ = ., df=, p=.). Other sources of advice normally
had no influence on how and when rodents would be controlled. The fact
that rodents were controlled individually indicated farmers had confidence
in the way they managed rodents, and they did not need to rely on actions of
others to influence their decisions.
Farmers’ Confidence
It was expected that farmers’ ability to make general decisions in their daily
life would correlate with their experience, farm size, quantity of production,
crop yields, age and formal education. However, quantitative analyses
show that, of these factors, only education was associated with farmers’
ability to make daily decisions, and this relationship was relatively weak
(G=., p=.). This result suggests that there could be other unstud-
ied factors that are more fundamental to farmers’ decision-making ability.
Labor Availability
Most farmers hired local laborers to assist them in their rice cultivation. De-
pending on farm size, the number of laborers hired ranged from a few to tens of
laborers engaged in different tasks throughout the season (see Figure ). Very
large landholdersmight have hired hundreds of laborers over a whole cropping
season. There were no cases where farmers reported exchanging labor with
other farmers throughmutual aid. Thewidespread availability of hired laborers
suggests that farmers can afford to pay for hired labor to support their rice
production, and that they are no longer reliant on kin, neighbors or friends.
Means of Production
Most farmers reported having basic production assets to support rice culti-
vation. Motorcycles and boats were available in many households. Heavy
work such as plowing, threshing and transportation of produce could be
contracted through local services and equipment rental. Therefore, reliance
on manual workers and mutual aid for heavy work has primarily been
replaced by mechanization and open markets for services.
Capital for Agricultural Inputs
Agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and the like were
normally not purchased by cash but on credit. These services were
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competitive and are very common in An Giang, as well as in other parts of
the Mekong Delta. Farmers prefer the credit system, because payment does
not need to be made until the harvest. Although interest rates were charged
for such services (typically ranging from  percent to  percent per month),
the rates were, by and large, acceptable to farmers. This service was so
convenient that borrowing of money from family members became rare. In
addition to these local credit services, other sources of funding for rice
production were available from local banks. However, although loan appli-
cations were increasingly easier to obtain, farmers typically only used banks
for investments of one year or more or when a large up-front payment was
needed. There were no cases where farmers reported borrowing money from
neighbors or relatives for their rice farming, suggesting that they are more
financially stable in their rice production than they were in the past. Indeed,
given the fast-growing credit market, financial services were easily accessible
at the community level, which released farmers from reliance on traditional
sources of financial support such as kin, friends or neighbors (see Table ).
The above data suggest that farmers were far more independent in their
rice production than in the past. Other supporting evidence also suggested
that improved household economic status has allowed farmers to become
more self-sufficient. The increasing independence of farmers has meant that
they are no longer dependent on their traditional support networks for
mutual aid. Therefore, to understand more about how contemporary social
capital among farmers has changed with the decline in mutual aid, we
T A B L E 4 : Sources of Capital Used for Agricultural Inputs
Source for Input Number of responses Percentage (n=223)
Savings 168 39
Input supplier 167 39
Local bank 74 17
Family member 11 3
Leaser 10 2
Cooperative 1 0
Other 1 0
Wholesaler 0 0
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investigated farmers’ associational life, especially relationships with residen-
tial neighbors, farm-plot neighbors, kin and friends.
G R O U P L E V E L S O C I A L C A P I T A L
To understand social capital changes at the group level, we investigated
farmers’ associational life and activities, especially the current state of con-
nectivity within former mutual aid networks (e.g. kin, neighbor and friends).
In particular we investigated communication channels and the relationship
between these channels and the ability to make daily decisions, associational
involvements and memberships, norms of reciprocity and social trust, and
the issue of consensus building.
Communication Channels
Farmers reported that the major groups they make daily contact with are
their friends, neighbors, and relatives. They frequently meet with these
people to discuss issues related to agricultural production. The three most
commonly discussed issues are crop production, purchase of agricultural
inputs, and marketing of farm produce. Although farmers responded that
siblings are the emotionally closest kin, they tended not to be the people that
farmers have daily contact with, suggesting that their siblings were not
always geographically proximate (see Figure ).
In terms of ability to make general daily decisions, most farmers reported
that they are able to make decisions that affect their daily life:  percent said
they can always make necessary decisions;  percent almost always; and
almost  percent said only sometimes. Relatives and friends were the pri-
mary contributors to the ability of farmers to make daily life decisions, while
residential neighbors and farm neighbors were more responsible for farmers’
daily agricultural updates. Kin, particularly siblings, appeared less important
in agricultural information updates. There was a strong relationship between
farmers’ ability to make daily decisions and the networks they maintained
for daily information updates with friends, residential neighbors and
relatives (in descending order of importance). We also assessed farmers’
beliefs about the strength of social cohesion in their village and their percep-
tions about their personal network, but we found no strong relationship
between these two factors.
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It is clear that despite farmers having daily contact with lots of different
people, when it comes to day-to-day decision-making, farmers tend to con-
sult the relatives and friends they trust the most and from whom they feel
most comfortable making a request. This pattern of communication suggests
that friends and relatives do remain important in supporting farmers’ daily
decision making. However, it appears that siblings are not part of farmers’
daily face-to-face information channels for agricultural production support,
likely because farmers’ siblings are geographically distant. In our assessment
of relations and distance between farmers and their networks, it was found
that neighboring farm owners are not likely to be farmers’ kinsmen (as
shown in Table ). There was a very small likelihood of a farmer having
a farm neighbor who was also his kin, which is very different than in the past
when farmers and kin were geographically close to each other and might
farm plots next to each other. Land law reforms and land markets, as well as
migration pressures, were the likely cause of these land ownership changes.
Associational Involvement and Membership
According to Laura Morales Diez de Ulzurrun, interaction within associa-
tional activities builds social trust, norms of reciprocity and social networks.
These are achieved through face-to-face interactions that help people
develop trust with people beyond their usual acquaintances, thanks to
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Fr
ie
nd
s
N
ei
gh
bo
r
Re
la
v
es
Si
bl
in
gs
Fe
llo
w
 tr
ad
er
s
Lo
ca
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
/
te
ch
ni
ci
an
/E
xt
en
o
ni
st
Co
lle
ag
ue
s
A
ge
nt
s
Crop producon
Purchase of inputs
Markeng of produce
Business
Daily news
F I G U R E 3 : Farmer Daily Communication Sources and Topics (n = 223).
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positive cooperative outcomes. In terms of associational activities in the
study sites, Figure  shows that farmers participated in numerous local
meetings, and they tended to participate in neighbor and hamlet meetings
more than governmental meetings. Although one-third of farmers claimed
membership in the communal Farmers’ Association, none of them reported
involvement in meetings conducted by this association except via a few
meetings of local farmers’ clubs affiliated with it. Farmers’ official member-
ship in local organizations related to farming was therefore very limited.
This situation was also common in other parts of the Mekong. On the part of
farmers, it also appears that the demand for networking to support rice
farming, both formally and informally, was not strong.
F I G U R E 4 : Sources of Associational Life and Frequency of Local Meetings.
T A B L E 5 : Odds Ratio (Kin/Non-Kin)
Distance
(in metre) 100 200 300 400 500
500-
1,000
>1,000-
5,000
>5,000-
10,000
Odds (kin) 0.452 0.077 0.037 0.043 0.004 0.476 0.244 0.011
Odds
(non-kin)
2.212 12.947 26.895 23.091 264.000 2.099 4.096 87.333
Odds ratio
(kin/non-kin)
0.204 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.227 0.060 0.000
NOTE: Odds Ratio (OR) is used to quantify how strongly the presence or absence of property
A is associated with the presence or absence of property B in a given population.
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Despite this, we also noted that farmers were inclined to do charitable
works outside of agriculture, especially for their local community. Eighty-
three percent of respondents (n=) reported working with other people in
their village or neighbors to do something for the benefit of their community
in the past year (see Figure ), implying that social reciprocity, while on the
decline in agriculture, is not totally absent from Mekong village
communities.
Social Trust
Social trust plays an important role in developing a civic culture and com-
munity development. It reduces transaction costs in economic activities and
is considered an indicator of the health of social relations within a community,
potentially affecting the way social capital is formed. It is sometimes used as
“the best or only single indicator” to measure social capital.
Residential neighborhood relationships were a good indicator of social
cohesiveness and trust at the local level. Generally, it was observed that
neighbor relationships were very good. Neighborhoods continued to be the
place where farmers went to exchange information, and where young chil-
dren could be sent when adults worked in their fields. Indeed, neighbor-
hoods were important in the sense that they may be the main geographically
Charitable 
organizaon, 71.7
Contribute 
to public 
interest, 
11.0
Building roads , 6.3
Building house 
for the poor, 5.8
Building bridge, 2.1
Help vicms of 
flooding areas, 1.6
Contribute to 
temple, 0.5
Burial service 
group, 0.5
Red Cross, 0.5
F I G U R E 5 : Voluntary Works by Type of Works (n=191).
88 T U AN , C O T T R E L L A ND K I N G
This content downloaded from 137.219.46.245 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 00:12:52 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
proximate source of support, especially in cases where relatives live farther
away. Neighborhoods were also the places where farmers enjoyed their
leisure time, having chats or sharing meals. In cases where neighborhood
relations were particularly good, money could also be borrowed.
However, when it came to making daily decisions, kin and friends ap-
peared to play a more important role than neighbors. With the exception
of cases where residential neighbors were siblings or relatives, sensitive
matters such as money borrowing, personal disclosure, or seeking consul-
tation about one’s own family’s issues tended to be limited to the farmers’
own family networks. Labor exchange among residential neighbors was
almost non-existent, despite some reported cases where mutual help was
fostered through good relations. In the past, neighbors commonly helped
each other repair or build houses. This was based on the understanding that
support could be returned when needed. However, this kind of labor
exchange was not common, as labor for house repair or construction was
typically hired. Unpaid support was only common among siblings and
relatives. Nevertheless, some exceptions existed where good neighbor rela-
tionships through mutual aid were maintained.
In short, despite neighborhood cohesiveness superficially appearing to be
the same as it was when mutual aid groups were still operational, we believe
social trust has declined. Farmers explained that with household economic
improvements, previously open communication had declined. For example,
one farmer suggested that when it came to his neighborhood, only  or 
percent of farmers still depended on neighbors for general or daily help. None-
theless, farmers did appear to be very keen on doing charitable work. The level
of involvement varied among farmers; those with limited financial resources
typically concentrating on fundraising, whereas those who were better-off
preferred making in-kind or financial support. Donations of rice after harvest
were common and regular enough that inmany communes specialmotorboats
were devoted to collecting rice donations during harvesting season. However,
farmers stated that they preferred donations to go to their own kin.
Farm Neighbors
Farm neighborhoods experienced dramatic changes following the  Land
Law and the discontinuation of mutual aid. Land reform in particular led to
COLLECT IVE R ICE FARMING PRACT ICES IN THE MEKONG DELTA 89
This content downloaded from 137.219.46.245 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 00:12:52 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
land concentration. In the study site, there were many cases where farm lands
were owned by people who lived in other districts or provinces; these land-
owners did not directly farm, but hired local labor to manage their crops. In
Lạc Quới commune alone, it was estimated that two-thirds of rice lands were
owned by people who were not local residents. Land concentration was not
limited to An Giang, and has been a growing concern in all of the Mekong
Delta. Given this problem, it was very difficult to maintain and develop farm
neighbor relationships, as there was low capacity to build trust and cooper-
ation due to high rates of absentee ownership. The fact thatmany ownerswere
not localmade it difficult to use newly introduced agricultural technology that
required collective action to be successful.
As an example, the issue of inter-field roads to support transport of farm
products was sometimes problematic, and a factor which affected farm
neighbor relations. Given the lack of roads, negotiation among farmers to
arrange for paths to allow produce to be transported during harvest was very
important. Transport of produce over fields typically compacts the soil,
making preparation for the new crop more difficult; farmers were therefore
hesitant to allow pathways for others through their lands. Similarly, disputes
over the arrangement of labor for maintenance of irrigation channels among
upstream and downstream farmers was not always smooth, making good
relationships among farm neighbors more challenging.
Farmers who reported close relations with both residential neighbors
and farm neighbors were becoming rarer; likewise for the case of kin.
However, in places where land fragmentation was less extensive and
farmers were local residents, communication was frequently maintained
among farmers with adjacent fields, usually on a daily basis. At the field
level, daily communication was most commonly observed between resi-
dential neighbors, followed by relatives and siblings. When communica-
tion was maintained daily, general help between farmers, such as
borrowing money, child care, exchanging of farming equipment, etc. was
more likely to occur.
Consensus Building
When a collective action was needed, farmers reported that they required
the facilitating role of the communal People’s Committee and Farmers’
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Association, who could initiate mobilization to achieve a particular col-
lective action. Farmers indicated that they found it hard to reach a con-
sensus on their own in their daily farming activities. They stated that
arriving at a consensus among them was very challenging, and that their
fellow farmers did not typically have a strong and long-term commitment
to an agreed set of actions. This was due to differences in opinions and
preferences for decision-making regarding issues that take place on one’s
own field.
At the field level, it was evident that farmers no longer relied on their
traditional sources of support from residential neighbors, farm neighbors
and kinsmen to cultivate their crops. The need to cooperate among rice
farmers at the field level no longer seemed to be a rational choice for rice
farmers, as taking care of oneself appeared to be the best choice. Farmers
themselves acknowledged that they are now more individualized than
before, though they said the values of kinship and good neighbor relations
remain unchanged.
Discussion and Conclusion
The foregoing analysis provides clear evidence of changes in social capital
among rice farmers in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. The discontinua-
tion of mutual aid among rice farmers was due to several factors that
cumulatively contributed to the process of change. Increased use of mod-
ern rice varieties, apart from their benefits in productivity, augmented
labor pressure on farmers’ traditional support networks. Improved access
to reliable irrigation, in addition to enhancing land-use productivity, also
introduced an increasing labor shortage, especially at peak times during
cropping seasons. Further, given the enactment of the revised Land Law
in  that recognized farmers’ individual right to land use, the land
market was freed up, resulting in increased land trading. The conse-
quence has been an increased disparity of land size, as poor farmers sell
off their lands due to economic shocks. These changes in land ownership
have disrupted the relationships that traditionally fostered labor exchange
practices. The decline in the exchange of labor was then exacerbated by
the liberalized rice market, which encouraged private rice production (see
Figure ).
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When the reliance on labor from mutual groups decreased, farmers
moved away from norms of reciprocity. As traditional labor exchange net-
works for rice production gradually declined, there was a concomitant
increase in individual rice farming practices. The consequence, at the end
of this process, was a decrease in reciprocity among farmers of the same farm
neighborhood, resulting in challenges for consensus building and collective
action. Although kinship relations and residential neighborhoods remain
important for spiritual and social aspects, they no longer play the role that
they used to in terms of group farming. Overall, individual rice farming has
become the new norm in An Giang. While the social factors that influenced
these changes in social capital in rice farming practices could be different in
other parts of the Mekong Delta, given the cascading impact of each factor
we are likely to see similar consequences elsewhere as a result of these
processes and policies of agrarian reform.
We conclude from the above analysis that the historical existence of mutual
aid was fostered simultaneously by a high need for collective farming to ensure
subsistence and the availability of closely knit human networks, or social
capital, that facilitated the exchange of labor. The degree of cooperation at
the farm level has decreased compared to the past, as reflected in the levels of
trust, networks, and norms of reciprocity. With the ongoing land
F I G U R E 6 : Illustrative Causal Mechanisms for Decline of Mutual Aid.
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concentration due to land markets, and the lessening dependence among rice
farmers on mutual aid, the rebuilding of relationships among rice farmers has
become challenging. This new situation resulted in certain difficulties for the
mobilization of collective action for collective goods at the field level, causing
issues for projects requiring collective action. Restoring social capital among
rice farmers in the Mekong Delta will require government, or development
partners, to understand the existing stock of social capital of the target com-
munities to appropriately design their development intervention approaches.
Our study suggests that given the decreased stock of social capital among
rice farmers in the Mekong Delta, agricultural production activities that
require consensus building for long-term collective action need to be thor-
oughly analyzed to understand potential constraints, and there is a need for
careful design of development programs and interventions. Failure to analyze
social capital among the target groups may result in program failure, partic-
ularly in agricultural production projects or natural resources management of
common pool resources that require collective action. It is important for any
development program that requires collective action that social capital be
analyzed among the target groups in order to make appropriate interventions
right from the design stage of the program. Since social capital is important to
the success of collective action, a lack of social capital may become a potential
risk to intended development outcomes if it is not well understood. The
government may need to initiate actions at the policy level to overcome the
decreasing stock of traditional social capital, particularly for rural agricultural
development in which sustainable collective action of target communities
determines the success of the planned development programs.
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A B S T R A C T
This paper describes how the social capital of rice farmers of the Mekong
Delta of Vietnam, as manifested in the tradition of collective farming
practice, has changed. Collective rice farming persisted for decades,
irrespective of critical events that challenged its continuation, due to two key
factors: the high need for collective farming to ensure subsistence, and the
availability of a closely knit social network that facilitated the exchange of
labor. Despite its longevity, the practice of collective farming, particularly in
terms of labor exchange and mutual aid in farming activities, has not been
maintained under current agrarian reforms. Land reform, increased
mechanization, and shortened crop cycles leading to labor shortages have all
resulted in individualized rice farming, making mobilization for
spontaneous collective action at the community level challenging.
K E Y W O R D S : social capital, rice farming, collective work, Mekong,
agriculture, agrarian reform
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(): –.
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Edward Elgar Publishing, ).
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. Alexis de Tocqueville, “Of the Use which the Americans Make of Public
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York: Alfred A. Knopf, : , ), cited in Ostrom and Ahn, Foundations of
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[] in Elinor Ostrom and T.K. Ahn, Foundation of Social Capital (Cheltenham,
UnitedKingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, ), –; Jane Jacobs, “TheUses of
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heiten, ed. Reinhard Kreckel (Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co., ), –.
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(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ).
. Elinor Ostrom and T.K. Ahn, Foundation of Social Capital.
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Development , no.  (): –.
. Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, “Social Norms and Human Cooperation,”
Trends in Cognitive Sciences , no. (): –.
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and Destruction of Social Capital: Entrepreneurship, Co-Operative Movements
and Institutions (Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar,
).
. Although the sample size is , the n value varies in Tables - because only
valid responses were analyzed.
. See for example Kerkvliet and Porter, Vietnam's Rural Transformation; Ottfried
Kirsch, Vietnam: Agricultural Cooperatives in Transition Economies (Heidelberg:
Research Centre for International Agrarian and Economic Development,
Discussion Paper No. , ); Pingali and Võ Tòng Xuân, “Vietnam:
Decollectivization and Rice Productivity Growth”; and Wiegersma, Vietnam:
Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution.
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. Pierre Gourou, Les paysans du delta Tonkinois [The Peasants of the Tonkin
Delta] (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, ) cited in Cao Dương
Phạm, Vietnamese Peasants under French Domination.
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. Kirsch, Vietnam: Agricultural Cooperatives in Transition Economies.
. Rambo, A Comparison of Peasant Social Systems.
. Pingali and Võ Tòng Xuân, “Vietnam: Decollectivization and Rice Productivity.”
. See Rambo, A Comparison of Peasant Social Systems, and MacDonald Salter,
“The Broadening Base of Land Reform in South Vietnam,” Asian Survey , no.
(): –.
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; see Salter, “The Broadening Base of Land Reform.”
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each tenant farmer averaging two hectares. The rent that they had to pay was
around  percent or more of their crop. See Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant
Land, Peasant Revolution.
. Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution.
. Võ Tòng Xuân, “Rice Production, Agricultural Research, and the Environment,”
in Vietnam's Rural Transformation, ed. Benedict Kerkvliet and Doug Porter
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, ), –.
. Kirsch, Vietnam: Agricultural Cooperatives in Transition Economies.
. Prabhu L. Pingali, Nguyễn Trí Khiêm and Võ Tòng Xuân, “Prospects for
Sustaining Vietnam's Reacquired Rice Exporter Status,” Food Policy , no. 
(): –.
. Đào Thế Tuấn and François Molle, “The Chao Phraya Delta in Perspective:
A comparison with the Red River and the Mekong Delta, Vietnam.” In
Proceedings of the International Conference on The Chao Phraya Delta: Historical
Development, Dynamics and Challenges of Thailand's Rice Bowl (Bangkok:
Kasetsart University, ), .
. Pingali, Nguyễn Trí Khiêm and Võ Tòng Xuân, “Prospects for Sustaining
Vietnam's Reacquired Rice Exporter Status.”
. Cecelia Luttrell, “Institutional change and natural resource use in coastal
Vietnam,” GeoJournal, vol.  (): .
. Normal Uphoff, “Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and
Experience of Participation,” in Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, ed.
Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Seregeldin (Washington, DC: World Bank, ),
–; A. Krishna and Norman Uphoff, “Mapping and Measuring Social
Capital through Assessment of Collective Action to Conserve and Develop
Watersheds in Rajasthan, India,” in The Role of Social Capital in Development:
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An Empirical Assessment, ed. Grootaert and Thierry Van Bastelaer (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, ), –.
. Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development,” Third
World Quarterly , no.  (): –.
. Krishna and Uphoff, “Mapping and Measuring Social Capital.” Likewise, trust,
reciprocity, exchange, common rules, norms, sanctions, and connectedness, and
networks and groups, as identified by Pretty and Ward. See Pretty and Ward,
“Social Capital and the Environment.”
. In our statistical analysis, p values were insignificant for other reported sources
of advice, including farmers’ partners, extension staff, mass media, training
knowledge, or agricultural input suppliers.
. Before doing statistical tests, we recorded data for these variables in groups to
avoid skewed frequency distribution across the groups and to ensure
representativeness for each group level.
. Goodman and Kruskal's gamma test was used to measure rank correlation:
G=., p=. for age; G=., p=. for experience; G=., p=.
for rice area owned; G=., p>. for total production quantity; G=.,
p=. for yield level.
. Interest rates charged to farmers by local suppliers varied from  to  percent
per month (mean=., mode=, SD=.).
. G=., p=., n= with relatives; G=., p=., n= with their
friends; G=., p=., n= for house neighbors and G=-., p=.,
n= for farm neighbors.
. Partial correlation shows that the association between farmers’ ability to make
daily decisions and the degree to which they assessed the social cohesion of their
village (rS=., p<.) becomes even higher when controlling for “relatives”
(rrelatives=., p<.) and “friends” (rfriends=., p<.).
. Laura Morales Diez de Ulzurrun, “Associational Membership and Social Capital
in Comparative Perspective: A Note on the Problems of Measurement,” Politics
and Society , no.  (): –. See also Francis Fukuyama for his
description of the concept of overlapping radii of trust and Grootaert for the
spillover effects of local social interactions on household welfare in Indonesia.
Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development”; Grootaert, “Social
Capital: The Missing Link?”
. See Robert Putnam, Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in
Contemporary Society (New York: Oxford University Press, ); and Pretty
and Ward, “Social Capital and the Environment”.
. Gaute Torsvik, “Social Capital and Economic Development: A Plea for the
Mechanisms,” in Rationality and Society , no. (): –; Russell Dalton,
PhạmMinh Hạc, Phạm Thanh Nghị, Ông Thị Như Ngọc, “Social Relations and
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Social Capital in Vietnam: Findings from the  World Values Survey,” in
Comparative Sociology , no.– (): –.
. Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, “Who Trusts?: The Origins of Social Trust in
Seven Societies,” European Societies , no.  (): 
. Though the composition of the friend network is not known in detail, the
frequent report of the usefulness of this channel indicates that farmers place
a high level of trust in their friend network, which supports them in addition to
their kinship network.
. Chi-square = . with df=, p<., n=.
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